

# Afroscope

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[editor@monitor.upeace.org](mailto:editor@monitor.upeace.org)

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Editorial

As the world becomes closer knit, with free markets, globalisation, and democracy, the immensity of the challenges facing humanity in the face of such an evolution swells. The highly visible effects of all these progressions are the adverse and diverse impacts impounded on the environmental, and the economic, social and political enclaves of our lives. A sense of hope and a spirit of widened vision surround some of these progressions, but the majority have lead to despondence and a persistent deterrence of hope. This turbulent imbalance is reflected in the deeply embedded nature of our world; a world marred by cultural cleavages and violence.



In an effort to refurbish and preserve the decency and dignity of humanity in the midst of these catastrophic, yet boundary breaking waves of change in global society, a culture of peace is being embraced. This culture has its strongest component ingrained in creating an identity that challenges the power and authority of the many that embrace the torch of violence. This is a culture that becomes instrumental when it is based on a foundation that embraces the uniqueness and variety of all cultures, all people and all lifestyles, while unifying them in a context of respect, constructive identity of togetherness, and, above all, shared humanity.

Thus, it is within such a setting that the UPEACE African Community has collected this selection of articles to contribute their vast and gained knowledge to the culture of peace. AFROSCOPE is therefore the effectual instrument that the community has envisioned as the pivotal method for making such a contribution. This edition reflects the diverse experiences, practices and learned background of the African community and those beyond.

Every action of courage and knowledge is often met with an equal and worthy response from another's understanding and experience. Therefore, every grain of information shared in this magazine is done in contribution to the on-going and different veins of thought and experiences that are upheld throughout the world. It is by identifying, and also sharing, all this that we hope to create a deeper understanding of various dimensions of the same issues. We believe that this AFROSCOPE magazine will inspire a dialogue about our shared commonality and differences essential to the spread of a culture of peace.

**Maria D. Phiri**

Afroscope Magazine 2009 Chief Coordinator

### From The Rector

I am grateful to Maria Phiri for giving me the opportunity to contribute a forward to the second edition of *Afroscope*.

We at the University for Peace welcome all creative student initiatives. We are extremely proud of the creativity of our students, and encourage them all to draw on it while they are with us at our campus in Costa Rica. This creativity takes many forms, and depends on the individual talents and energies of the students themselves. We have seen many products of this creativity, including the student entertainments, like Africa/Middle East night this year, which all the members of our community, including our neighbors from the village of El Rodeo, enjoy immensely. These are part of the fabric of our community, give it the sense of cohesion which all of us feel. We take inspiration from the energy of the students, and we see in them the promise of the future.



We had one edition of the magazine in 2005, and this stands to be the second published African student journal. Our African program, based in Addis Ababa, has inaugurated an extraordinary academic publication, called the Africa Peace and Conflict Journal, edited by Professor Tony Karbo. It is a unique publication, a peer-reviewed academic journal focused on African issues, and containing articles of academic research largely written by African scholars. But *Afroscope*, which has been developed and written entirely by students from Africa at our main campus in Costa Rica, is something really special, created, written and edited entirely by our African students, during their busy one-year stay with us.

I think of Africa as the future. It is a continent of such vast human promise that none of us can truly understand its implications. It lies there, waiting and preparing for its moment, to take its role leading the world to a better future. Its leaders, like Nelson Mandela, or "our own" Kofi Annan, have already inspired us all. And we are proud to have some future leaders from Africa in our midst at UPEACE. They tell us, all of us, things we cannot know. Their voices are an essential part of the rich cultural mix we take pride in at our campus.

My heartfelt thanks, and congratulations, go out to Maria Phiri and all her colleagues who contributed to the preparation of *Afroscope*. I know just how much work, and pure creativity, has gone into this effort. We at UPEACE are impressed and grateful.

#### **Jack Maresca**

Rector of the University for Peace

and locate those who have African food and spices/seasonings to also contribute these items. Fatima was allocated the responsibility of ensuring that eating utensils were available for visitors, monitor and also the organization of the food area in the UPEACE cafeteria (table set up for actual day including food tags). Meanwhile, Golda assisted with past experience and providing advice, all this didn't come easy.

I must say that this group of students was amazingly confident in what they were doing, and this showed during a number of meetings leading up to the actual day. Everyone did their part and they must be applauded. This group has set the bar to higher heights and the next group coming must reach this level. Congrats to all who contributed to making the African/Middle cuisine delicious and sumptuous indeed.

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#### **Africa Night Entertainment**

*Maria Phiri*

*"Entertainment is always the heart of a jovial and fun-filled gathering"*

Truer expressions cannot be uttered, hearing about the success of the 2008 African night event I must admit posed a challenge towards organising an equally colourful and fun-filled event this year. With the initial date of the event changed from December, it seemed that in due time, all things would eventually fall into place by the time the month of April dawned on us. Apparently, the people who always say 'it is better to always be prepared in advance' actually had more understanding of the manner in which times tends to fly when one has a zillion activities to prepare!

Organising an entertainment package that would keep people awake and completely mesmerised was quite involving and took a lot of imaginative thinking. We had to conduct a lot of mind-picking dialogue with a number of people in order to ensure that we had a cross-cutting entertainment troupe. It also meant contacting other African and Middle Eastern students from other Universities and colleges such as Earth and United World College. Numerous levels and means of communication had to be established, putting

strategic contact persons in each place. A series of activities that each group was familiar with had to be exchanged, with reminders about constant rehearsals always been sent to these places and persons.

All in all, what was critical concerning the organisation of entertainment was that fact that it was often more convenient to have more performances on the entertainment list, than what would actually be required within the allocated time. This way, it secured the committee against the setbacks of last minute withdrawals or changes. In addition, we also made sure that each country present within the African and Middle East community at UPEACE submitted a documentary/or musical videos about their country or region to be played throughout the actual day of the event on the television screen or projector. These representatives also were requested to each prepare a performance based on their country of origin and also their cultures, so that the event would enlighten the audience on the diverse and rich cultures of these continents.

Above all, "it was the persistent and constant optimism held by the Committee that the event would be a success against all odds that actually made the UPEACE and audience beyond attest to the fact that the African/Middle East Night of 2009 was a huge and breathe taking cultural event!"

the day that would mark the last big event of its kind for the academic year 2008-2009 at the University for Peace. Indeed, Upeacers were still talking, with much remembrance, about the wonderful Thanksgiving, Asian Night, and European Night, but now all the eyes were open and happy to finally enjoy the AFRICA/MIDDLE EAST NIGHT 2009.

In the morning of April 17, African and Middle Eastern students appeared in their nice white T-shirts that attracted the attention of many other members of UPEACE. The message was: AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST, THE CRADLE OF CIVILIZATION: UNITED FOR PEACE. Undoubtedly, there was unity for peace. The belly dance performed by our friends from the United World College was completed by various African and Middle Eastern dances from Soudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, Rwanda, Mali, Cameroon, Jordan, Uganda, Iraq, etc. The most interesting thing was that this day turned out to be an international night. Indeed, various men, including Asians, Americans, Europeans, etc, looked like Touaregs from Niger in their long white dresses with nice veils; beautiful ladies from various countries performed a Rwandan dance in their nice *Imishanana* (Rwandan traditional outfit), and nobody will forget the attractive fashion parade that included several nationalities, guests, students, and staffs in their African and/or Middle Eastern clothes. That was the real picture of UPEACE dream. No more Greek, no more African, no more Latino(a), no more ... no more ... but all united as ONE.

FOOD, FOOD!!!!!!!!!!!! After enjoying delicious Afro-Middle Eastern cuisine, the whole community met in front of the UPEACE cafeteria where we danced until late at night. We had nothing to fear as the UPEACE administration together with Africa/Middle East Night organizers had worked hard to make everything successful. THAT WAS A REAL DAY TO REMEMBER. VIVA UPEACE!!!

**Mouth-watering and finger licking African/Middle Eastern Night Cuisines!**

*Candido Bardalez*

Besides the other organizing committees for the 2009 African/Middle East Night, there was one very important committee appointed by the coordinators of the event - the Food Committee. No food for the night would have been a catastrophe too huge for the Upeace African students to live with for the rest of their time at Upeace. I mean, not just regular food, but the essence of African traditional foods cooked by African students attending Upeace.

At the first meeting to discuss and appoint members of the 2009 African Upeace student body to steer African activities that was mainstream among the new ideas. The main agenda was the 2009 African/Middle East Night with open and full support from past students like Golda and Peace. Among them were Ameena and Mahmoud both staff at Upeace. From the feedback they gave of the 2008 activities, we immediately realized that the road ahead would be a challenge, not just to meet the challenge to have good African cuisine for over three hundred students, staff and visitors but to make it even better.

This led the coordinators to make special focus to form a food committee that would comprise dedicated, motivated and individuals who had the will to face the challenge. The committee got started with a couple people like Peace and Shahinaz. Thereafter, a coordinator of the food committee was appointed, Candido, who was representing the Caribbean alongside Lillian, Steven, Mohamed, Sara, Golda and Fatima.

Each group member was tasked with a responsibility.



Lillian was responsible to head a food workshop teach African recipes to Upeace community, Steven to estimate food

budget and coordinate this along with finance committee, Mohamed and Sara to compile list of people willing to cook and those not cooking, allocate those not cooking to assist those cooking

UPeace African Community: Administration Perspective

Dear AFROSCOPE and the African UPEACE community,

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to your request to share my perspective on African students and their place and role at the University for Peace.



First of all, you have greatly enriched my life and that of staff, faculty and other students at the University. You see things from a different perspective than many of us, and that has helped the rest of us to better understand you, and to better understand ourselves. You bring with you a high respect for your elders and professors. Simultaneously, some of you have come from war torn nations.

You listen patiently and learn well those things that you hear about in lectures. You are polite, patient and considerate. Yet, even though, for many of you, it is not a typical part of your background to speak freely to a person in a position of importance, you have been willing and able to take the risk to share your unique perspectives, as different as they may be at times. And you share your perspective without being confrontational or negative.

Time and time again you have learned to and have successfully moved the discussion ahead, rather than acting in a way that might cut it off, or escalate it into conflict.

Though you each come from different nations across Africa, different cultures and different languages, you have made the effort and been successful at coming to know, appreciate, accept and work with each other. You have simultaneously maintained your own individuality, your own personality, your preferences, your style, and you have shared your appreciation.

You have brought fun, excitement and joy to the students and staff through Africa Night and your participation and leadership in numerous other activities, both inside and outside the classroom.

Thank you for the opportunity to experience, to explore, to learn and to play with you. It has been my honor and my joy. I anticipate keeping in touch with some of you, and I look forward to the opportunity to meet other fine people from your nations and your continent.

Respectfully, with great appreciation,

**Charles A. Skinner**  
Consultant to the Department of Academic Programs

government has to think about these legal restrictions as a real obstacle to the empowerment of the Egyptian woman. This is the time for Egyptian women to raise their voices and to play a role in the Egyptian politics in the way Mahmoud Moukthar imagined it in the Awakening of Egypt statue.

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Osama Moftah is a master's degree candidate in International Law and the Settlement of Disputes at the University for Peace in Costa Rica.

Reflections

Africa/Middle East Night 2009

*Jean-Bosco Habyarimana*

In the academic year 2007-2008, African students and Staff of the University organized a very exciting African night. We know this because we could hear testimonies from various people who shared this experience. It created the feeling of joy and

fear within many of us who were asked to prepare this event for the 2008-2009 academic term.

On the one hand, we were joyful to learn that, in the spirit of sharing cultures and traditions in which all UPEACE community members learn from each other, our fellow Africans were very successful. On the other hand, to organize the same event after this big success was challenging to us, because we knew that many members of this community who have shared last years success would be expecting something great, or even greater, than what they saw and this was not an easy thing to do.

The year 2009 brought interesting realities though. The decision to include Middle East students is one positive example. Our African ancestors say, "a single head does not advise itself, but it helps itself become a fool" and "there is strength in numbers". The whole UPEACE community had been waiting for so long, and this day was not coming. The DIPS students had to leave Costa Rica before this day, with much regret of course and we were sorry for that, but finally came April 17, 2009,



## The Woman as a symbol of Egypt

*Osama Moftah*

When you visit the grounds of Cairo University, you will find an Egyptian sculpture of a woman standing next to a sphinx, looking forward and resting her hand on his head. This sculpture is called the Awakening of Egypt (*Nahdet Masr*) and is a symbol of modern Egypt looking to the future. The idea of representing Egypt as a woman is not new to the Egyptian artists; you can find a lot of similar paintings in the pharaonic temples. Furthermore, in the Egyptian dialect the Egyptians always refer to Egypt as a woman or the mother of all Egyptians.



The image of the Egyptian woman in the artwork reflects how women played an important role in Egyptian life. This role has changed according to the changes in Egyptian lifestyle. In ancient Egypt the society was based on agriculture, and consequently the paintings in the Egyptian temples symbolised the spiritual and economic role of woman as a life-giver and supporter to her husband. This role changed to a political one in the 19<sup>th</sup> century when the United Kingdom occupied Egypt. At that time women in Egypt succeeded in integrating into Egyptian political life and their role was culminated when she participated along with men in the Egyptian revolution against the British occupation.

After the independence of Egypt the political system changed and the role of the woman also changed as a response to that. The military government at that time tried to fix the deficits of the capitalist economic system in Egypt by empowering the farmers against the capitalists. While the military government tried to target these sanctions against the capitalists, many of these regulations affected the position of woman in Egypt. The Egyptian woman's right to participate in the political life is an obvious example of that.

During the last 30 years, the participation rate of women has not exceeded 5 %, which does not reflect the reality that more than 48% of

Egyptians are women. There is no legal rule that prevents women from taking a more active role in politics, but the mechanism for elections in Egypt converts this right to a dream for many women.

From the legal point of view, the Egyptian constitution stipulates the principle of equality between man and woman in rights and duties. Article 40 states: "All citizens are equal before the law. They have equal public rights and duties without discrimination between them due to race, ethnic origin, language, religion or creed". Accordingly, an Egyptian woman has the right to participate in the political life, manage her own business, and have her own independent personality within the family.

However the Egyptian constitution in Article 87 determines a percentage of 50 % of any Parliamentary Assembly for the workers and the farmers. This article, indirectly, decreases the percentage of Egyptian woman in any Parliamentary Assembly because there are few women workers and farmers.

Moreover, there are not many women who have experience in the political arena, and therefore political parties in Egypt prefer men as a candidate over women. It is axiomatic that the main goal of any political party is to maximize the number of seats it has in parliament without any care of who sits there, be they man or woman. In order to achieve that goal, the political party will focus on choosing the candidate who has the most political experience and support among his/her constituency.

Perhaps this political obstacle was one of the reasons that gave the Egyptian woman the enthusiasm to search for herself in another area. The private business enterprise was the preferred place for Egyptian woman to work apart from the political career and the bureaucracy in the governmental jobs. The United Nations reports showed that participation of women in the labour force increased from only 11% in 1980 to 18% in 1990 and to 22% in 2001.

Today Egyptian women fully participate in the economic and cultural life although she is still lagging behind in terms of political participation. In my view, the structure of Egyptian society has changed and there is no justification to keep on the political policies of the 1960s. The Egyptian

## Promoting the Culture of Peace through Peaceful Means

*Jean-Bosco Habyarimana*

In a world characterized by social inequalities, injustices and several violent conflicts, one might wonder whether the existing privileged leader's use of violent means to solve violent conflicts will



lead to the creation of a peaceful world that world leaders will then ironically use to justify their competition and strengthening of their military power and presence. For some "experts", having "disciplined" and "professional" armies is synonymous with "armies without borders" in charge of ensuring "peace and stability" in the world, as illustrated by the following quote:

*Africa has too many so-called soldiers, too few real soldiers. Those the Europeans left behind are ageing and isolated. I know. I taught them. What is needed is a new structure of military authority. European intermission can, and should bridge the gap. Europe's disciplined armies, small as they have become, are repositories of what ought to be treasured qualities, honour, duty, the impulse to self-sacrifice. (Sir Keegan, J., 2005)*

In the words of Sir Keegan, European armies are professional, knowledgeable, disciplined, and able to teach Africa's "unprofessional" "not real soldiers", which is not a new concept because the same unlimited superiority was used to justify slavery and colonization. Africans were defined as uncivilised, undisciplined, emotional, and undeveloped creatures made to be educated, and then domesticated by the human beings from Europe. Realistically speaking, Keegan's opinion is not far from what happens today in the name of "peace". As in the time of the Peloponnesian war, military power still implies decision making power. Is there any difference between the following two ideas?

*"But you and we should say what we really think, and aim only at what is possible, for we both alike know that in the discussion of human affairs the question of justice only enters where there is equal*

*power to enforce it, and that the powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must."* (Athenians talking to Melians: Hooker, R., 1996).

*[...] I like to tell people when the final history is written on Iraq, it will look like just a comma because there is — my point is, there's a strong will for democracy."* (Interview with George W. Bush: Steve Benen, 2006).

However, the aim of this article at this level is not to bring one or another on the table of judgment, neither does the article aim at standing against the rights to have "disciplined" armies. On the one hand, the question is whether military professionalism and discipline would be considered as characteristic for one group of people just because they are Europeans, and unprofessionalism and indiscipline be used to characterize the other side just because they are Africans.

On the other hand, if one agrees with the definition of professionalism and discipline for the European Armies as Sir Keegan puts it, then it would also be correct that several African armies have, in different periods of time, served as professional and disciplined armies as well. Nevertheless, if we consider examples on the ground, we find that both European armies and African armies were, and still are unprofessional and undisciplined in one way or another.

For example, two years before Keegan published his article, the Serbian army under the control of President Slobodan Milosevic had conducted an ethnic cleansing campaign against Albanian populations (Roland PARIS, 2002). In the same context, Sir Keegan published his article 4 years after the Hutu government of Rwanda organized and carried out killings of almost a million innocent people, the majority being Tutsis. In addition, killings of innocent people in Kandahar, in Iraq, and elsewhere, are unprofessional for Western armies.

I agree with Sir Keegan that there is a need to change things for the better. There is no doubt that education structures have been used as tools to disseminate the current selfish system that favours the strong over the weak by giving the first the power to decide on the present and the future of the whole world. If we recognize the need to use education as a pre-requisite to

meaningful peace (Ochola II, Rt. Rev. Macleord Baker, 2004), we need also to stop considering ourselves as saints and attributing our failures to others, because world and human beings do not exist apart from each other, they exist in constant interaction (Paulo Freire, 2005).

Thus, it would be useful to realise that if there is such a much needed lesson today, as suggested by Sir Keegan in order to eliminate the causes of war, it would not only be for the African continent. It would instead be for the whole of humanity. And the content of that lesson would not be about strengthening the armies, because these armies, even the so called disciplined and professional ones, have proven incapable of eliminating the very causes that push the ones Sir Keegan calls “young men with guns” to take these guns that are surely produced and distributed for the purpose of war-making.

Furthermore, the lesson would be, for instance, to help the world understand that sustainable peace begins when the hungry are fed, that it is equally true that feeding the hungry begins when peace comes, that the current global warming crisis that is common for the whole world cannot be stopped by B-52s any more than nuclear proliferation can, and that only cooperation in the form of binding treaties can accomplish either task (Ochola II, Rt. Rev. Macleord Baker, 2004). “In order to combat the culture of violence that pervades our society, the coming generation deserves a radically different – one that does not glorify war but educates for peace, nonviolence and international cooperation.” (Reardon, B. & Cabezudo, A., 2002). Thomas Friedman in Renner Michael (2005) understood this idea and said that “If we’ve learned anything from September 11, it is that if you don’t visit a bad neighbourhood, it will visit you.”

The responsibility to bring about change lies with each of us to proclaim that ‘just as wars begin in the mind of men’ peace also begins in our minds because the same species who invented the war is capable of inventing peace (Adams, D., 1989). Indeed, if leaders of powerful countries continue to keep a hand of control over weaker nations for their own selfish reasons we will never be able to ensure a sustainable peace. The Campaign Statement of The Hague Appeal for Peace Global Campaign for Peace Education clearly shows the way forward in saying that:

*A culture of peace will be achieved when citizens of the world understand [real] global problems; have the skills to resolve conflict constructively; know and live by international standards of human rights, gender and racial equality; appreciate cultural diversity; and respect the integrity of the Earth. Such learning cannot be achieved without international, sustained, and systematic education for peace.*

(Reardon, B. & Cabezudo, A., 2002)

To sum up, today humanity as a whole understands that current methods of resolving conflicts and restoring sustainable peace by guns could not at all be effective for common challenges we face that are mainly caused by economic inequalities between the groups as well as struggles over political power, land and other economic assets (The United Nations Development Programme, 2004). Therefore, if we really mean change, the effective way would not be more investments in building so called “disciplined and professional armies” that have and will always fail to ensure sustainable peace but for, human beings at all levels to focus on peaceful means of peace building by reassessing their work and seeing whether it strengthens or softens the push toward equity (Gorski, P.C., 2005).

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#### Do you remember?

Jennifer Francesa Acio

Do you remember

When we used to sit

Around the smouldering faggots

With anxious eyes

Glued to mama’s aromatic cauldron?

Awe-struck by the glistening stars

That seemed to hold our future?

How about the odysseys

Through the village jungle

The endless skirmishes through the village square,

And the hide and seek we played:

Do you remember them?

Those girlish coquettish giggles

As we pranced in agility

Our pots balancing elegantly on our heads,

As we headed to the stream

To the envy of village dudes,

Do you remember them?

When my brother called you wife

It was to you like strife,

And you were filled with rage,

Because you weren’t of age!

Do you remember how bitterly you cried?

Then, we were littl’uns,

Aspiring doctors, lawyers, engineers,

Eager to unearth the world of the big’uns.

All reality was unreal,

And all else so surreal!

Our innocent dreams

Lay in our innocent brains

We saw every corrective treatment as a punitive one,

And questioned all acts of justice

For to us those were injustices.

But all that is in the past

Now we are mature, full grown adults.

Let’s let go of the naiveté.

Adjust to our today and stash away our yester years.

For is it for nothing life is called bitter-sweet?

It offers both gall and honey.

It is embroidered with thorn-infested roses,

Running through gullies and peaks.

Now that we are of age,

Bitter reality we must ingest.

No more coy giggles

Born of meaningless tickles.

No more leisure at the stream,

For life is so fast we can miss the cream.

No more hide and seek,

For you might get lost for ever.

And even though you were sleek

You might just cause another palaver.

My teenage friend,

You are still my friend,

But times have changed

And we must swim with the tide.

You can not go on bouncing forever,

Nor can you go on day dreaming forever.

Stir from the dream and live its nightmare.

Emerge from the cocoon of fear

And stare stark reality in its face.

Unearth the scum

And clean it apiece a time

Stop singing songs of yester years

For lamentation begets sorrow.

Live in the present,

And stop conjuring up images of the past

For those, my friend, were just dreams.

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Jennifer Francesa Acio is a master’s degree candidate in Gender and Peace Building at the University for Peace in Costa Rica.

mutual dependence and benefits. Water can even help achieve the continental unity for which states in Africa have been striving for half a century. Striving for African unity, which in the past was ideologically and politically viewed as a requirement for genuine independence, stability and prosperity, seems to be currently reinforced due to the challenges to achieving a degree of water supply security. It can generate a cooperative momentum even with regions outside Africa that can provide capital for making economic sense of the African river waters.

Significantly, however, through positioning conflicts within a wider regional conflict complex, water may provide for greater political stability necessary for economic development and prosperity. Additionally, a secure inter-basin water supply necessitates the political reforms and democratisation that are necessary for involving the communities straddling the regions where water constructions are built.

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Mahmoud Al Zain is a professor in the Environmental Security and Peace department at the University for Peace in Costa Rica.

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Jean-Bosco Habyrimara is a master's degree candidate in Peace Education at the University for Peace in Costa Rica.

#### State Fragility: Discourse in the African Context Tony Karbo, Ph.D.

Within the international donor community 'fragile states' are characterised by their weak capacity or willingness to protect the welfare of their populations. The British government's Department for International Development (DFID) produced a policy document in 2005 entitled *Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States* in which "fragile states" are defined as those that "cannot or will not deliver core state functions for the majority of their people". It is stated that levels of poverty within such states are acutely higher than in other Lower Income Countries (LICs) due to their inability to provide safety and security, deliver basic services and protect and support the ways in which the poorest people sustain themselves<sup>1</sup>. That many of these states are those of developing countries, Ikpe claims that a state is not deemed as fragile if it can manage the development transition process and ensure its stability through peaceful management of change<sup>2</sup>.

Whilst such a definition may render any 'developing' country as fragile, donor policy makers certainly acknowledge that a states capacity or willingness to manage such transition is in fact on a continuum and cannot be approached with a 'one size fits' all policy. Consequently, fragile states have been broadly categorised as "strong but unresponsive" to its peoples needs, such as Zimbabwe and Sudan, "weak but willing" such as Ghana, and "weak-weak" states such as Somalia because they pose "serious challenges to poverty reduction" (DFID: 8).

That many states categorised as 'fragile' are in Sub Saharan Africa makes it imperative to assess why and ultimately the potential for donor effectiveness at state building in the African context. In working in Africa, the Overseas

<sup>1</sup> DFID (2005) *Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States*, Department for International Development, London.

[www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/fragilestates-paper.pdf](http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/fragilestates-paper.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> Ikpe, E. (2007) 'Challenging the Discourse on Fragile States' *Conflict, Security and Development*, Vol 7, No. 1, pp 85 – 124.

Development Institute states that the goal of the donor community must be aimed at “closing the sovereignty gap”<sup>3</sup>. Implicit in this prescription is the acknowledgement that most African states since decolonisation can be characterised as ‘Quasi States’. According to Jackson, whilst such states acquired ‘juridical’ sovereignty at independence and enjoyed legal recognition as states within the international community, they disclosed limited ‘empirical’ sovereignty, in that “the concrete benefits of sovereign statehood are often limited to fairly narrow elites and not yet extended to the citizenry at large”<sup>4</sup>.

Many scholars of African politics have observed a variety of factors causing the disenfranchisement of the majority of African citizens from the ‘state’. For example, Young accredits the problems of the post-colonial state to the crisis of national cohesion and loyalty to the central state because the imported state lacked the ‘nationhood’ of Europe, and the maintaining of unrepresentative inherited colonial structures by the new elites<sup>5</sup>. In his seminal book *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, Herbst analyzed state creation and consolidation in Africa and has found that the unique and fundamental problem facing African states is how to “broadcast their power over sparsely settled lands...inhospitable territories that contain relatively low densities of people”.

The realities of establishing accountable governance institutions perceived as legitimate by a states citizens themselves are ultimately undermined by contradictions. This is because ‘outside’ intervention is fostering ‘self’ government, foreigners are effectively defining ‘legitimate’ local leaders, and ‘universal’ values are promoted as a remedy for local problems<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> See ODI (2005) *Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to Statebuilding*, Working Paper 253.

<sup>4</sup> Jackson, R. H. (1990) *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World* New York: Cambridge University Press. pp 21.

<sup>5</sup> See Young, C. (1982) ‘Patterns of State Conflict: State Class and Ethnicity’ *Daedalus*, Spring.

<sup>6</sup> See Jahn, B (2007) ‘The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Part II’ *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* Vol 2. and Paris, R & T. Sisk (2007) ‘Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas

Luckham contends that whilst elements of the Western defined formula for statebuilding (liberal democracy, good governance and economic liberalisation) are desirable in themselves, “the entire package, and the manner that it is promoted or imposed from the outside, tends to inhibit the fundamental rethinking that fragile states require about the nature and purposes of political authority”<sup>7</sup>.

Moreover, successful statebuilding would ultimately require in-depth research which assesses the roots of a state’s fragility and the complex factors that may elicit its collapse. By examining the case of Somalia’s ‘collapse’ in 1991, one can begin to comprehend the multifaceted nature of the country’s fragility proceeding state failure, which in turn enables our understanding of why policies aimed towards ‘rebuilding’ the Somalia state continue to face significant challenges. Culminating factors can be identified as ineffective leadership, colonial inheritance, global geopolitics, failed international statebuilding and regional conflict. Chronic economic mismanagement throughout the 1980’s and the despotic nature of Said Barre’s leadership meant that Somalia lacked both capacity and political will to protect and provide for its citizens as the state merely became an instrument of repression and personal enrichment.

The period of Barre’s rule is shaped by the bipolar global context and the impact of the geo-political interests of the Cold War superpowers. Considerable military support from the superpowers highlight how Somalia was heavily militarised in Africa as a top recipient of US and Soviet military aid during the Cold War (116). Evidently the militarization of the state would only have had the effect of buttressing such an oppressive and fundamentally illegitimate leader. Thus, when western intervention into states presently deemed as fragile is justified on the grounds of preventing them from becoming breeding grounds for terrorism as in Somalia

of Post War Statebuilding’ *International Peace Academy* Report, November 2007.

<sup>7</sup> Luckham, R. (2004) ‘The International Community and State Reconstruction in War-Torn Societies’ *Conflict, Security and Development* Vol 4. No. 3. See p 498.

actors with new perspectives and new approaches who, as non-state actors, have come to increasingly reshape the future of the Congo-Nile regional complex, which has historically been a state-actor business. Such recognition and the participation it necessitates is important for avoiding civil strife and the risk of sabotage of the inter-basin water constructions. Whose hand would be on the tap in connection to the inter-basin water supply is important to know. Unlike in the Ethiopian highlands, it would be possible to block the flow of river water augmented from the Congo and it could prove disastrous if countries downstream became highly dependent on it. A political reform on regional scale to allow for greater participation by communities in the Congo-Nile region may decrease the possibility of civil strife, therefore, the risk of sabotage.

Calls for this participation have already been heard in the region. Epistemic communities and scientists from different countries and from different disciplinary backgrounds are increasingly engaged in Nile affairs, for instance. This will contribute a great deal to lessen the seemingly prevalent ecohydrological illiteracy.

Recently, public opinion in the Nile Basin, for instance, is being more effectively engaged in water issues, at least in the East African riparian states’ parliaments—increasing the potential for making water “everybody’s business”. According to Lundqvist (1999:62), ‘Making “water everybody’s business” implies various things. It explicitly widens the view on who should be actively engaged in efforts related to water management. The notion transcends conventional interpretations of central concepts such as suppliers [and] beneficiaries’ (Lundqvist 1999:62). Involvement of these communities is crucial to mitigate the syndromes of their plight. Local capabilities must be duly recognised and involved in visions at various levels, as the user level should be the abode of some of the most vital management options and decisions (Lundqvist 1999:62). Associated with the values of participation and democratisation, are considerations for the multi-faceted role of women in water-related issues and interlinkages between poverty, lack of clean water and basic sanitation services, and social problems; hence, the need for radically new and innovative ways for addressing the water crisis (SIWI 2001).

Involvement of local communities as civil society organisations provides an alternative think tank for conflict resolution and for dialoguing over issues of concern which decreases the incidence of violence over water and land use. Citizen participation or public involvement, in the view of Vlachos (1999:74), ‘have become not only the noble cries of an environmentally conscious society, but also the presumed imaginative tools for creative planning and for the achievement of a broad consensus for desired action’. Citizens’ participation can occur at different levels and take different forms, including water/land parliaments.

The idea of “river parliaments” is currently being discussed in India, consisting of upstream and downstream civil society institutions with the aim of coordinating and bringing upstream and downstream users together to understand their respective problems and jointly pressure the state to improve river-basin management within a participatory framework (Agarwal 1999:126). In March 2004, Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia agreed to set up a joint parliament involving all Nile riparian states (*Sudan Tribune* 12 March 2004). The proposed NBI Parliamentary Assembly (NBIPA) is meant ‘to assure that there is a dialogue and to make a full cooperation between all countries of the basin and to try to develop certain common projects for all countries for their common interests’. As expected, because of the NBI being an intergovernmental organisation, this proposed body is clearly a parliament of states. It essentially lacks the quality and responsibility of a civil society organisation. Expressing the latter position, journalists and academics from five Nile riparian states, i.e. Sudan, Egypt, Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia, discussed the importance of engaging the media in efforts to achieve stability in their region (*Sudan Tribune* 05 May 2004).

### Conclusion

Water as a resource much needed by states striving to develop their full economic potential can truly be an instrument for achieving political stability. The argument advanced in this paper about the Congo-Nile inter-basin water supply solutions, shows that water can bring together regions that were hardly viewed to share common security concerns and establish them as one hydropolitical security complex. It creates new opportunities and generates new momentum for development, linking wider regions through

Political stability at the national level is crucial for developing the international waters. While political stability is necessary for all the Nile riparian states, it is the Sudan's stability that is of most immediate impact on increasing the water supply. In the late 1970s, renowned scholar John Waterbury (1979:209) observed, 'As far as the Nile is concerned, Egypt's stability is relatively meaningless while the Sudan's instability is of incalculable importance for it is the mid- and not the downstream state.' Over two decades later, Swain (2002:305) asserted that 'as long as the civil war continues in Sudan, any collaboration between the riparian states in the Great Lakes region and those in the lower basin will be extremely difficult'. Stark polarisation, accelerating political instability and the split of the Sudan into two states would have serious future repercussions on the Nile hydro-politics. A split in the Sudan may establish a new polarisation along the upstream-downstream spectrum, which might jeopardise the ongoing NBI. Viewed in this manner, a conflict that may obstruct the increase of water supply through inter-basin projects or otherwise is, therefore, not welcome by Congo and Nile riparian states. However, such conflict cannot continue to be viewed through the old lenses of hydro-sovereignty. The conflict in the Sudan in particular cannot be isolated from that of the Great Lakes region.

Thus, from a water security perspective, the Congo and the Nile could immediately be linked to the Great Lakes regional conflict complex though this complex leaves out many Congo and Nile riparian states. "Regional experts described the geographical fluidity of the conflict in the Great Lakes, which, at its peak, drew in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, the Central African Republic, Tanzania, and Sudan, not to mention the "core" states of Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)" (Rubin et al. 2001:6). A larger hydro-political security complex of the Congo-Nile region will be comprised of 16 African nation-states.

The scales that need to be emphasized here, as part of the Great Lakes regional conflict complex, are primarily border regions and local communities straddling them. In this kind of analysis, the local and the inter-basin regional scales should deserve special importance. Conflicts within the Congo-Nile regional complex

are straddling the watersheds of the two river basins; therefore, cannot be adequately understood through confining to discussing them in one basin rather than the other. The watersheds between the Nile tributaries and the Congo tributaries are the abode for various groups effectively engaged through social, cultural, economic, political and military networks and are crucial for causing regional stability/instability.

While the inter-basin water supply would largely be driven by national needs, the recognition of rights of localities, including those straddling the Congo-Nile watershed, to manage and benefit from water resources remains significant for political stability. In the Sudan, for instance, political stability, informed by localities rights, is necessary for two reasons. Firstly, it keeps millions of people in their productive niches, benefiting from "green water" instead of stressing the river—increasing withdrawals of and polluting the "blue water". Secondly, it represents a precondition for resuming water-augmenting policies, namely, the (partial) draining of the marshes, and provides guarantees for its sustainability. This, through Jonglei I and Jonglei II, could add more than 27 billion m<sup>3</sup> to supply as detailed earlier. Most significantly, however, is Sudan's importance, in the long run, for the grand strategy of Congo-Nile inter-basin water supply, which necessitates a sustained political stability. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that the two rival riparian states sandwiching the Sudan, i.e. Egypt and Ethiopia, oppose its split into two countries. Egypt may aspire to drain the waters of southern Sudan, which are attainable only under a united Sudan, with which it has signed deals. Ethiopia is concerned more about regional security and, therefore, endorses what would 'enhance unity, and not division' of the Sudan (*Sudan Tribune* 16 August 2004). However, should either destabilise the Sudan, the Nile basin-wide modalities—or for that matter the inter-basin-wide modalities—would become more complicated. Given the current condition, the attitude of Egypt and Ethiopia towards the Sudan may undergo significant shift from the Cold War/post-colonial *realpolitik*, which may allow for strengthening Sudan rather than weakening it and as well allow for recognising regional as well as local non-state actors.

The prerequisite to understand the real dynamics of the current condition is to recognise the new

today; one must not view such claims out of the historical context of interventionism preceding the failure of such states.

The idea of unity imposed upon the populace because "without an economic or social push towards the kind of national 'high culture' experienced in Europe, the idea of national unity came, paradoxically, to be reduced to an almost perfect negation of a common culture". However, from the perspective of a largely rural and diverse population, the idea of a common national culture was not something that could be identified with (Cornwell 66). In the context of African states with populations characterised by cultural pluralism (which relates to the complex and shifting interaction of affinities based on common language, ethnicity, religion and region), imposing the notion of a 'common' national identity will be inevitably fruitless.

Such marginalisation of traditional institutions through attempting to incorporate plural identities works in conjunction with the centralisation of the state. Such state reforms and the construction of political institutions since the Republic of Somalia was formed in 1960, as highlighted above, also failed to incorporate the network of indigenous institutions and informal networks that existed before the creation of the Republic. That Somalis have no experience with a centralised liberal democratic Somali government is due to the fact that individual identity and the daily operation of society are derived from clans and subgroups within clans, which Coyne suggests serves as a major constraint on any attempts to centralise governance and decision making to the state level (Coyne 2006: 347). Coyne observes the Somali perception of politics as a zero-sum game because establishing a central political authority will create a conflict with inevitable losers as certain individuals and clans attempt to become political winners.

According to Richard Cornwell at the Institute for Security Studies the African's states fragility and lack of capacity to deliver public services for its population is also rooted in Western aid policies during the 1980's. Under the 'Washington Consensus', Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPS) tied aid to conditions to the effective 'roll back' of the state which was to reduce public expenditure, privatisation of public services, economic liberalisation and currency devaluation. Cornwell

states that not only did SAPS "undermine the basis of the social contract underpinning the foundation of the post-colonial state structures", but they also contributed to the "growing informalisation of the economy" (Cornwell 2006: 71).

Such informalisation of the economy has resulted in what Sandbrook has coined as the process where citizens are effectively "avoiding the state" in order to find solutions to their problems. In contrast to Western history where the public realm has been shared between the state and civil society, in the post-colonial state the welfare needs of its citizens may not be address and so populations seek alternatives at the local traditional level to provide such functions. Many scholars of anthropology have exemplified this through the notion of African kinship organisations, or the 'primordial public' which have emerged over several centuries as alternative public institutions which "bind together members of the same natural and assumed (including ethnic) groupings" (Ekhe 1992: 193).

Since the complexity of African politics is that it covers a far more diversified political space than that of the public realm in the West, what is therefore needed is to "search for ways that will enable the state and Africa's civil society to be mutually engaged in the public arena, lessening the claims of the state for total ownership of the political space of the public realm" (1992: 197). Many observers of post-colonial state building in Africa have come to similar conclusions that imported governance devices will turn out to be incompatible with the principles and traditions of government in the African context.

However, the mechanisms by which African democratic values are exercised differ from those of modern liberal democracy as they operate on the basis of direct participation rather than on a representative basis, reducing the need for electoral mechanisms. Therefore, certain imported political technologies such as majority based electoral systems are unlikely to resolve conflict relating to the incorporation of various ethnic entities into the state, for example. This paper is not seeking to argue that all African traditional mechanisms are applicable at the state level. Rather, it is to reassert the statement made by ECA Report that "Africa's transition requires that some mechanisms of traditional institutions

are applied to complement the modern mechanisms of democracy in dealing with critical problems that cannot effectively be addressed through the latter alone" (ECA 2007: 19).

It has been stated that "the relativity of state fragility makes it an empirical rather than normative construct...fragility is a dependent variable and not an independent or original condition" (Osaghae). Evidently, there is the need for Western fragile states discourse to encompass the complex variables which have culminated in a state's 'fragility'. Through using the example of Somali state history, such factors have been identified in this paper to include colonial state inheritance, ineffective leadership, the challenge of 'nation' building, global geopolitics and regional instability. Moreover, in the context of failed international institution building and the inherent contradictions of externally imported state models, the case of Somalia signifies the importance that focus must shift towards the role of endogenous mechanisms of governance in the state building process.

Institutions can loosely be defined as "the formal and informal rules governing human behaviour and the enforcement of those rules" (Coyne: 351). With such a definition in mind, there is clearly a need to expand narrow western conceptions of how institutions are formulated, which actors can legitimately constitute institutions, and how various traditional and informal networks can be compatible with and even enhance the effectiveness of the state. In order for this process to be successful, statebuilding discourse must simultaneously shift focus towards the decentralisation of the state apparatus. There have been studies documenting the success, despite lack of formal state recognition, of this approach displayed in Somaliland's constitution which has attempted to incorporate traditional institutions within the state apparatus. Further research must be done in this area using country specific examples in order to avoid replicating 'one size fits all' discourse.

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Tony Karbo is the Programme Officer of the Africa Programme for the University for Peace in Ethiopia.

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### Climate Change: Unequivocal Across Africa and the Climate Change Injustice

*Stephen Ngonain*

Over the past 250 years, deforestation, combustion of fossil fuels, land use changes and production of agricultural commodities, such as rice and livestock, have caused atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>), methane (CH<sub>4</sub>) and other greenhouse gases to rise significantly (IPCC, 2008). The greenhouse gas effect is a phenomenon in which naturally occurring greenhouse gases absorb ultraviolet rays of the sun from the earth's surface and radiate back to space causing normal warming of the atmosphere. But the incidence of a higher and unexpected amount of these greenhouse gases in the atmosphere traps most of the ultraviolet rays radiated from the earth and sends them back to the earth resulting in more warming of the climate system. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2008), increases in greenhouse gas emissions have been associated with an increase in the mean global temperature from 0.3°C to 0.6°C since the late 19th century. By the end of the 21st century greenhouse gas emissions could cause the mean global temperature to rise by an additional 1.4°C to 5.8°C. Massive industrialization in the "Global North" from the late 19th Century has been a major contributor to the emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that have been continuously warming the climate system.

Africa is at a great disadvantaged because warming of the climate system occurs globally but Africa appears to be warming faster than the global average because of its varying climatic effects and vast geography (Collier *et al*, 2008). Today arid or semi-arid areas in northern, western, eastern and parts of southern Africa are becoming drier, while equatorial Africa and other parts of southern Africa are getting wetter. The continent is, on average, 0.5°C warmer than it was 100 years ago, but temperatures have risen much higher in some areas, such as some parts of Kenya, which has become 3.5°C hotter in the past 20



could provide the base for a Nile "industrial zone", increasingly shifting water to this sector from agriculture, which now consumes over 90 per cent of water. Large amounts of water could then be reserved for further rehabilitation of mid-stream ecosystems and upstream "agricultural zones" towards the year 2050. An industrial sector in Egypt, which employs large numbers of people and consumes less water, could then exchange manufactured goods for agricultural products from Congo and Nile upstream riparian states. Agricultural development in the upstream and mid-stream should lead to less population concentration and sustainable urbanisation, which should mean less pollution downstream. If the waters from the Congo are to be channelled across western Sudan this would bring about major ecological and economic changes in the areas it flows through. This would mean that the depopulated regions such as northern Darfur and northern Kordofan would largely recover and, therefore, reduce their massive population migration to the downstream RZ if not reverse it.

#### ***From hydro-sovereignty to hydro-solidarity: the role of non-state actors in achieving greater political stability***

Water supply and management can be used as instrument for achieving stability and prosperity in the Congo-Nile region. Efforts to ensure political stability must be a major objective of the Strategic Action Programme for the Nile and for a similar arrangement for the Congo. This is because while all other attempts at stabilising the system provide sufficient conditions it is political stability that represents the necessary condition—it is necessary for increasing water supply, which in turn is necessary for carrying out the intended economic development projects and achieving economic mutual dependence. Despotic, theocratic, and authoritarian regimes in the Nile and the Congo basins are certainly obstacles in the way of a sustainable water supply and the current environmental situation renders such regimes obsolete. In fact, good management of water resources necessitates a process of democratisation and this implies swift moves on the part of the leadership of the Nile and the Congo riparian states to effect some change both internationally (among their states) and nationally (within their states) with the ultimate goal of achieving political stability.

At the international level, a shift from a preoccupation with perceptions of national security to one based on environmental and regional security is a necessary move the Nile and the Congo riparian states should make in order to achieve inter-basin-wide political stability. This necessitates a paradigm shift from "hydro-sovereignty" to "hydro-solidarity" geopolitical imagination. This implies that the increasing of water supply should be primarily led by the spirit of caring for the urgent requirements of those who need water, not for accumulating power for those already powerful. It should in fact serve to break the zero-sum game that characterised relations, especially among Nile riparian states (see Stroh 2003:107). Political stability at the international level resides in the acceptance of the principle of equitable rights to water and preparedness to endorse initiatives which aim at economic development of the once target-to-weaken rival co-riparian states.

At the national level, however, the situation is more pressing. From a water security perspective, it shows how significant political stability at the national level is for political stability at the international level. Ethnic and religious fundamentalists in Rwanda and the Sudan, for instance, have caused enormous destruction in the Nile Basin, resulting in deplorable instability in the Congo-Nile region at large. Political stability necessitates considering the causal effects associated with conflict in the Congo-Nile region both in their historical and current contexts. Worth noting here is that conflict over resources in the Congo-Nile region are often driven by ethnic and religious discourses. The Nile region in general was the host of some of the most radical transformations in human history, in which appeal to religion is well entrenched. The River Nile was the abode of the first monotheist religion on Earth and we can claim with certainty that on its banks countless battles were fought to establish that monotheism or to resist it. Referring to the current situation in the Horn of Africa, Markakis (1996:474) notes that 'religion often served as the ideology of social conflict in the Horn, and history seems to be repeating itself'. Thus, it is not surprising that some ruling elite in the Nile Basin countries resort to violent religious measures instead of innovating solutions to resource scarcity that can best be worked out with the atmosphere of opening and up and good neighbourliness.

highlands. Cooperative terms should be founded on a hydro-solidarity ethic; namely boosting what could efficiently sustain the economies of the Nile upstream riparian states and the Congo riparian states through use of "green water" on the one hand and as well boosting the economies of the downstream through "blue water". Hydro-solidarity, in this respect, is essentially an inter-basin shared responsibility about the sustainability of local watersheds, regions, whole basins, and whole territories of riparian states and ultimately contributing to sustainability of the whole Earth. Exchange of produce (whether produced through using "blue" or "green" water) should be viewed not only for its own sake but most importantly for its conscious contribution to enhancing mutual dependence among these Congo-Nile riparian states. Among others, 'awareness of mutual dependence' in the view of Stroh (2003:107) is one condition for facilitating cooperative, therefore, constructive solutions to conflict over the Nile water. At an inter-basin level, this should contribute to addressing constructive solutions to conflicts that occur in the wider region of the two basins.

One major development area for achieving mutual dependence and (eco-)hydro-solidarity is hydropower development. The Nile riparian states, in reciprocating for the large amounts of water from the Congo, should help riparian states in the latter basin develop their hydropower potential. In the Nile Basin itself, the largest hydroelectric potential is in Ethiopia—a major contestant for Nile water whose potential water abstraction might significantly decrease the flow of the river downstream. Power development and power trade, according to Hagos (2000:6), is anticipated to be one of the most feasible cooperation projects for the Eastern Nile sub-basin countries. In our understanding, development of hydropower and the associated jobs to be created can be pursued as compensation to Ethiopia for waters, which otherwise would be used for creating jobs through irrigation. For the sake of achieving mutual dependence, the power generated in Ethiopia could be marketed through Egypt, as a distribution terminal. However, this Nile industry would become more feasible and more attractive for actors who could contribute to larger regional stability if the great power potential of the Congo would be added to it.

This idea of tapping the Congo's hydropower potential has already been fermented in association with the inter-basin "regional alternative" and a clear picture is being painted with some already existing infrastructure. According to Majzoub (1998:261), the Egyptian minister for electricity and energy announced that Egypt would establish an international centre for controlling the electric transmission networks between Europe and Africa through the unified Arab network, especially in connection to the Inga Dam project in DRC. He notes that the production of the giant Inga project should reach 60,000 MWh, 25 times that of the High Dam (Majzoub 1998:261). Its prospective network extends from the DRC to Egypt and through to the eastern Arab states and then on to Turkey, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe. To the latter, the network goes through Morocco. For this reason, Cairo could be considered the international electricity stock market (Majzoub 1998:273, see also Waterbury 2002:132).

The Inga project resolves the electrical power problems of a large number of consumers. It is worth mentioning that demand for electric power has increased rapidly in most Arab countries in the last 20 years. It increased 12-fold in less than two decades, from 22,000 MWh in 1974 to some 246,000 MWh in 1993. The increasing importance of the electricity sector is reflected in the monies allocated to it, estimated at US \$32.2 million between 1970 and 1980; US \$130 million between 1980 and 1990; and US \$180 million between 1990 and 1995 (Majzoub:262-3). Such an extensive network, involving many beneficiaries, would restrain riparian states from using it to punish others in times of tension. The only risks are those associated with sabotage by guerrillas or possible attacks by terrorists and problems associated with maintenance.

Mutual dependence can be viewed through hydrosolidarity lenses, where the economic sectors of riparian states of the Congo and the Nile basins should economically complement one another. Associated with the hydropower stock market, one may suggest, in line with the "Nile-Congo Reforestation Fund", another fund for enhancing the industrial base in Egypt, creating a Nile industrial zone, as part of a basin-wide policy towards achieving inter-sectoral water allocation efficiency. Unlike most of the upstream riparian states, Egypt has an industrial foundation that

years. Global warming is said to make many of the problems which Africa already deals with much worse. It is really challenging and an appalling situation that from the 854 million undernourished people world wide, 820 million are from developing countries with the highest prevalence in Sub Saharan Africa (FAO, 2006). With all efforts targeted at meeting the Millennium Development Goals to halve the number of malnourished and hungry persons by 2015, it is sad to see that the number of hungry and malnourished people in Sub-Saharan Africa has actually increased to nearly 200 million in 2001-2003 estimates, from 170 million in 1990-1993 (GAO, 2007).

Although other factors, like socio-economic and political, HIV/AIDS and conflicts, also contribute to food insecurity, hunger and malnutrition in the sub continent, climate change remains one of the most glaring factors underpinning the series of famines in Ethiopia and the Sudano-Sahel zones of Africa. It is beyond all reasonable doubts that agriculture employs close to 60% of most of the countries in Africa and even contributes close to 50% of most countries GDP in the continent. In the past decades, there has been a decrease in agricultural yields in most countries in Africa, especially in the east, west and north, with general increases in food prices in 2008 that caused political instability and turmoil in most African countries between February and May of 2008. Droughts and low rainfall in 2008 in Ethiopia and Somalia left 3.25 million people in Somalia, along with 6.4 million Ethiopians, at risk of acute food shortages and in need of emergency assistance. These figures do not include the already chronically vulnerable food insecure 7.2 million Ethiopians (OXFAM, 2008).

Global warming and climate change variability have been major factors causing the huge migration of internally displaced persons and migrations across international borders as a result of crop failures from droughts and floods and the death of livestock. Climate change variability will affect agricultural production in Africa and the areas suitable for agriculture and the length of growing seasons and yield potential, particularly along the margins of semi-arid and arid areas, are expected to decrease. This decrease will adversely affect food security and exacerbate malnutrition in the continent, and in some countries, yields from

rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50% by 2020 (Brett Harris, 2009).

It is not an issue of doubt that industrialization and its forces have contributed immensely to economic development in the developed "Global North" and its effects have greatly impacted the developing "Global South". The effects of this rapid economic development have completely distorted the climate system leaving "Global South" countries to suffer these effects. Amongst these global environmental change victims as already seen from the previous section of this article is Africa, which stands as the most vulnerable. The impacts of climate change on the "Global South" are huge and today poor countries in the "Global South" are combating these impacts with all sorts of proposals and strategies for adaptations to the "climate change bomb". The tragedy is that the economic activities of the rich industrial countries have made the African continent suffer from the stresses of global warming when they have played virtually no role in the warming of the climate system. I call this the "unfairness" of global warming and "climate change injustice".

It remains an issue of questioning why the impacts of climate change are greater in the African continent than any other continent. There are a couple obvious reasons, some of which are; poor governance, long stays in government by many African leaders, dictatorship rule, deviation of aid and funds targeted for developmental projects, lack of institutional structures, and poor and inefficient agricultural policies and techniques. With these vulnerabilities, the slightest changes in climate variability, ranging from droughts to floods, have severe impacts on the kind of agriculture practiced in Africa. Ingenuity is also a serious issue in adapting to climate change impacts in Africa. The global northern industrialized countries have all kinds of modern technology to adapt to devastating impacts of climate change, yet the already vulnerable and poor countries, without this kind of sophisticated technology, are left to face and suffer all these climate change shocks with no assistance. Sustainable development and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals in Africa are under threat as a result of climate change. This article raises questions that need immediate attention like; how could Africa meet the MDG's targets of hunger and poverty, water for drinking, and basic sanitation when climate change is

underpinning the African ecosystems and resulting in the drying off of water sources for agriculture, drinking and sanitation? How will disease prevalence and death rates not increase in Africa? How will the illiteracy rate not increase where children have to drop out of school because they have to go for long distances to fetch water for their parents?

Climate change is seriously violating Human Rights and generating all forms of human insecurity problems in Africa and most of the developing countries. Climate change in Africa has been depriving the continent of a series of Universal Human Rights. How could the right to life and a good standard of living be achieved without water for drinking and basic sanitation and food, just to name a few? The role of states in international Human Rights is to respect, protect and fulfill Human Rights. Climate change has put stress on African states making them seem incompetent or unable to meet the basic needs of their citizens and thus appear to be violating Human Rights. In reality, the defaulters are the industrialized global northern countries. Africa is the least anthropogenic contributor of global warming and global environmental change, but remains particularly vulnerable to climate change effects. It becomes an issue of great importance that Africa should be unified with one voice both locally and at the international level and come out with efforts and strategies to address these challenges of climate change and variability plaguing the continent. "The Climate change Justice" should be re-defined and the perpetrators should intensify their efforts in remedying the "climate change dilemma" in Africa and some of the developing countries facing climate change impacts. The international community should intensify its efforts in consolidating climate change in the International Human Rights Law so that "Climate change justice" can prevail. Also, funds should be received from the perpetrators to subsidize adaptive and development projects to relieve the African continent of the climate change nightmare inflicted on it. There are a lot of irregularities and ineffective practices in the distribution of funds agreed upon in the G8 summit (to target adaptive and development projects to relieve climate change victims) because there is no legal binding document that defines and sets punishment on climate change defaulters. The only way forward will be the re-definition of International Human Rights Law to

guarantee victims of climate change their full Human Rights.

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Stephen Ngonain is a master's degree candidate in Environmental Security and Peace at the University for Peace.

surplus into the Nile's south-western tributary of Bahr Al-Arab inside the Sudan. Implied by the need for water not only in the Nile basin but also in the Middle East, the "regional alternative" opens wider scopes for cooperation for meeting increasing needs in the Nile Basin and the Middle East and could be made politically feasible. According to Majzoub (1998:258) since the mid-1990s, deep changes have appeared in political, economic and military relations in the world, especially in the African continent. The peace process between some Arab countries and Israel started to draw attention to the possibilities of Arab-African cooperation. The "regional alternative" project, if implemented, would provide 50 billion m<sup>3</sup> of water, which would resolve the water deficit in the Middle East and fill groundwater reservoirs with renewable water in the Nile Basin. Terminating the surplus of water could be through constructing channels that raise the water level of the tributaries of the Congo, such as the Oubangui and the M'bomou, so that the water reaches southern Sudan and, from there, the western desert in Egypt and the south of Libya (Majzoub 1998: 275-7). This project is financially and topographically feasible since its cost would entail digging a canal not exceeding 50 kilometres in length and lifting up the waters of the Congo tributaries that adjoin the Bahr Al-Arab (Majzoub 1998:280).

The implementation of the "regional alternative", according to Majzoub (1998:280-1), would eliminate the causes of tension between the Nile countries and provide water to meet the needs of the region in the future. The project is feasible for a large number of beneficiaries. The Middle Eastern countries have the capital and technology. What is needed is an integrated approach and partnership. According to Majzoub (1998:281), it would not be difficult for countries of the Arab Peninsula to finance and benefit from this project, which could provide them with water to be carried by two pipelines from Egypt to the coastal cities of the Red Sea and the Gulf. In his view, the task, however, remains to accrue the assured desire for cooperation among African and Arab states, mutual trust between peoples and rulers, and determination to benefit from the electric power and realise the development ambitions of the Congo riparian states.

The inter-basin water supply should not be viewed as reason for wasting the would-be-abundant

water or ignoring the principles of international water law. In fact, observing the principle of equitable utilisation of Nile waters by its riparian states should be crucial for achieving greater regional security. The length of the Nile, which under a "hydro-sovereignty" regime has been a source of problems in the past, can be made to generate the opposite now, by espousing hydro-solidarity ethics. Different ecological, climate, and topographical zones in the Nile Basin means that its countries have different seasons, which could be a great asset to overcome food insecurity resulting from seasonal food shortages and seasonal hikes in cereal prices (see Markakis 1998:99). These seasonal shortages and seasonal price hikes represent a cause of immense misery for rural communities in the Nile riparian states.

The variation in ecology, climate, and topography also means different products, which, therefore, can be exchanged among Nile and Congo riparian states in a preferential cooperative framework. Ethiopia, for instance, faces severe soil erosion due to deforestation and this very soil erosion, among others, presses Ethiopia to go for more Nile water. Forests in the Congo Basin were devastated by commercial logging, clearing for subsistence agriculture, and widespread civil strife. A fund for reforestation in the Congo and the Nile basins with the aim of benefiting from forest products (biomass, fruits, and other products which would become part of the livelihood of rural populations as well as for export) and serving the ecosystem would, therefore, produce a double advantage. Farmers, at least for some time, would abandon some of their soil-degrading cropping. Such an arrangement necessitates discussions about what Gordon and Folke (1999:35-6) call 'upstream-downstream *ecohydro-solidarity*'. This is precisely because 'it is the land area in the valley bottoms that is worst off', while 'it is the farmers located upstream in the landscape that will have to give up their crop production to secure the ecosystem services of new designed ecosystems, and the sustained crop production downstream' (Gordon and Folke 1999:36). The creation of a Nile-Congo Forest Fund would sponsor and take care of the needs of farmers awaiting their forests to mature and those interested to trade their forest products.

The downstream and upstream Nile riparian states could import from Ethiopia the produce necessary for the rehabilitation of the latter's

Meanwhile, climate change has become another factor in defining water scarcity. There are some worrying scenarios regarding the impact of climate change on the discharge of the Nile, where the latter is expected to significantly decrease. Meanwhile, there are some optimists' predictions about positive change, i.e. climate change contributing to increasing Nile discharge. However, in connection with the latter, even if these predictions of increased water supply come true, they might not plant a sense of security among the co-riparian states, should the latter take no cognisance of the trend of population concentration within the RZ. The co-riparian states might not feel secure especially because they are far from providing water efficiency alternatives in the near future, and so far there is no strategy to combat pollution. The latter, especially resulting from rapid urbanisation along river banks, may become a major cause of water scarcity given that it makes large water quantities unusable.

In the face of increased demand for water, the Nile basin riparian states are left with a couple of short and long term strategies to increase water supply. The way to increase water supply in the short run would be the resumption of the first phase of the Jonglei Canal (constructed to drain the waters of the large marshes, known as *Sudd*, in Southern Sudan) and to do the necessary preparations for its second phase. In this regard, whereas no increase in water supply can be sought from the source in Ethiopia in the short or medium terms (Shapland 1997:91), it is the stability of the Sudan and its ability to resume the construction of the Jonglei Canal that represents the most significant guarantee for any future increase of water supply. Stability in Southern Sudan is crucial for the second phase of the Jonglei Canal, which should, in the long run, cater for the demands of all Nile riparian states. In this respect, the stability of the Sudan contributes to resolving tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia as the Nile's main rivals in so far as huge amounts of water will be reclaimed from marshes and will pass through Sudan's territory. Tafesse (2001:103), along with Kliot, points out that the reclamation of marshes that exist inside the Nile Basin could yield 27.41 billion m<sup>3</sup>, 18.23 billion m<sup>3</sup> from the *Sudd* and Bahr el-Ghazal, 4.14 billion m<sup>3</sup> from the Machar Marshes on the Ethio-Sudanese border and 5.04 billion m<sup>3</sup> from the Kyoga marshes in the Equatorial Lakes. The first is totally inside the Sudan, the second largely falls in the Sudan and the water of that last

will be procured only if the first phase of the Jonglei Canal (totally inside the Sudan) is completed (see also Naff and Matson 1984:139, see also Shapland 1997:92).

Besides the above two strategies for increasing water supply, there is a need to enhance the adaptive capacity of riparian states in order to generate and adopt effective water management measures and the technical adaptive capacity necessary to develop water-saving irrigation methods. These methods include drip irrigation and ways of lessening seepage and spill over as well as seeking non-conventional alternatives such as desalinisation. Stroh (2003), along with Mason, asserts that 'Egypt's plans to curb its requirements by twenty cubic kilometers over the next fifteen years, a third of today's requirement, by increasing its efficiency (improved irrigation and cultivation techniques and more recycling) shows how much untapped potential exists'. If within 15 years Egypt can decrease its consumption by a third, in the longer run and given that it stabilises its population it might settle with around 35 billion m<sup>3</sup>, upon which time it could then decrease its consumption for the benefit of its own localised watersheds.

#### ***The Congo River and the Inter-Basin solution for water scarcity in the Nile Basin***

It is clear that conventional alternatives (increasing the riparian states' shares of international river waters and non-renewable groundwater) and non-conventional alternatives (such as desalination) might relieve Nile riparian states from serious water stress. However, it is also clear that they might not allow them to develop their full economic potentials. Failure to develop full economic potential, if considered vital, is no doubt a recipe for future conflicts among riparian states, namely that the riparian states see their high agricultural potential and yet they cannot develop it because of water scarcity. In this respect, the solution to this potential conflict is viewed in the inter-basin water supply that would not only help riparian states develop their agricultural potential but also help address the beyond-the-Nile Basin impacts that have always negatively impacted political stability in the Nile Basin and were very often overlooked.

The Congo River is considered to provide for the "regional alternative" by terminating part of its

#### **2010 World Appointment in Africa: South Africa Hosts The Cup**

*Candido Bardalez*

Sports enthusiasts, mainly those obsessed with the ongoing games for the World Cup 2010 in South Africa have been following the championships with great expectations that their



favorite team is to emerge victorious. The event is a special one for all involved, especially Africans, and specifically South Africans, similar to the Chinese in preparation for the 2008 Olympics, not only for economic investments, but also universal recognition. There is expected to be a mass influx of needed investment and economic gain in that period. Visitors will get to visit one of the most beautiful cities in the world, Cape Town. This gives the city a unique opportunity to improve its infrastructure and market itself to the world. The city expects that after the 2010 World Cup, equipped with a new stadium, transportation system, and other upgrades, it will be a desirable destination for leisure and business travelers, investors, and its residents, a legacy that will last (2010 FIFA World Cup, 2009). Amongst all this preparation and excitement, we cannot forget the past and what brought this passionate and extraordinary event to this point. As we take a brief look at the history of the sport, let's remember that the World Cup is not only a celebration of the sport itself but also the contributions it has made to sports and humanity in many parts of the world.

According to the website *Soccer Information*, football dates back almost 3000 years, with traces in many countries, including China, Japan, Italy, Ancient Greece, and Persia, among others. But it was in England that soccer/football really began to take shape. Long after, in 1863, England's football and rugby association split off on their different course and thereafter the Football Association was founded (Soccer History and Information, 2009). 1930 was the year of the first World Cup, known then as "The Golden Nike", founded by a French man by the name of Jules Rimet. The FIFA World Cup was founded in 1971 by Silvio Gazzanigi of Italy. In 1958, 1962, and in

1970, Pelé was the only player to win the Rimet Cup. After the first World Cup in 1930, it has been played every four years with the last one played in 2006. There is not much said on the general history of soccer in Africa but it is well known that they have been turned down to host the world cup in the years running up to 2006.

The history of soccer in South Africa dates all the way back to the 19<sup>th</sup> Century when in 1879 the first recognized soccer club was formed, known as the South African football association later known as FA. After one hundred years, it was reconstituted under its first name to represent all of the country's diverse communities. Eventually they started touring outside Africa. They began with countries in South America, including Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina, even beating the Argentineans, 4 to 1. Before South Africa's isolation in 1954, their last international match was against Israel. In 1963 the African team began again to represent the continent, playing against European clubs and other international teams including countries like Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Northern Ireland (The History of South African Football, 2009).

FIFA has not only contributed sports wise and economically to the world, but there are examples whereby they made contributions to peace. In 2003 "The World of Work" International Labour Organization (ILO) magazine reported that FIFA had teamed up to protest against child labour globally. The context was in Rome with the cooperation of its public transport company ATAC. According to FIFA, the campaign was described as the Red Card to Child Labour. About 2.7 million people were used as the target group, which consisted of those traveling to work, schools, those going shopping, and anyone who used the public transport. So through an already established concept, came the idea of the red card against child labour. In soccer, the red card is used in the following cases: **a)** serious foul play (includes any use of excessive force or brutality against an opponent when challenging for the ball), **b)** violent conduct, **c)** spitting at anyone, **d)** deliberately touching the ball with a hand in order to prevent a goal or to deny an obvious goal scoring opportunity, **e)** fouling an opponent to prevent an obvious goal scoring opportunity, **f)** using offensive, insulting or threatening language and/or gestures, **g)** or receiving a second yellow card in one game (Soccerhelp Dictionary Search,

2009). The red card initiative was launched in Mali, Africa against child labour and took a zero tolerance policy against child labour around the world. This was a joint effort by FIFA and the ILO to draw the attention of the global community to partake in addressing the root causes of child labour in the production of sporting goods and in other industries worldwide. Beside FIFA, soccer in Africa had also seen its way through apartheid:

*Racial integration in football has always been a source of pride with the sport helping to break the apartheid barriers, albeit in a slow process. But the Inter Racial Soccer Board organized representative matches from 1946. In the Natal province, the Indian, African and Coloured FA's competed for the Singh Trophy. In the old Transvaal province, it was the Rev. Sigamoney Trophy.*

*The South African Soccer Federation, which led the campaign against segregated sport and received its first major boost in Paris in 1955 when the International Olympic Committee acknowledged and recorded that discrimination against "non-white" sportspeople in South Africa, existed (The History of South African Football, 2009).*

#### **UPEACE Survey**

To show a little familiarity with the 2010 World Cup, part of the University for Peace community have participated in a survey that was conducted via E-mail with the sample group being those on the list of students whom are active in sports, mostly from the soccer team. The survey consisted of five questions, with the fifth question being just for entertainment. They were: 1) What is your knowledge of the history of world cup soccer played in the world so far? 2) Has your country ever participated (name country) and where have they ranked? 3) To your knowledge, which teams are the best teams and who do you project to win the world cup 2010? 4) Which players inspire you the most and why? And 5) Do you think that UPEACE will ever reach the world cup and why?

For question one, out of the 8 respondents, about 80%, shed some light on what they knew. Historically, the respondents were knowledgeable on the basic history of the World Cup, most answering that it is played every four years and that France won in France a couple cups ago, which was a huge event. Many of the respondents also mentioned that until 1994, the World Cup had been played on only two continents, Europe and

South America, with winners coming from these two continents. The fact that Uruguay won the first World Cup in 1930 was also commonly cited. About 25% of the respondents expressed their feeling that the World Cup is event that the entire world is enthusiastic about.

It seems that a low percentage of respondents were from countries that had made a bid for the soccer World Cup because only 1 individual responded somewhat to the second question and explained that, not himself, but his parents were from countries that had done well in the past. For him, he seemed to be somewhere in between, and in that way he may not be disappointed.

When it comes to the best or favorite team or country to win the 2010 World Cup, several respondents enthusiastically stated their position. "Brazil, Italy, France... Latin America in general" was the response of one individual. Interestingly, 100% responded favorably to this question or stated their opinion. From the 8 that responded, approximately 50% believe that the most likely winners of the 2010 World Cup are Argentina, Netherlands, Australia, Brazil, Spain, France, Italy, France, and England -- but no one came close to mentioning an African team or country. So there is a big challenge for any country in Africa to carve its name in history this time around. "A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step" -- and they have at least made that first step by being the host of the 2010 soccer World Cup.

In international soccer, spectators are usually excited about their favorite teams, but even beyond this, no matter what team you like, there are players that you imitate or idolize, whether he is from your favorite team or not. Indeed, in this day and age there are some very inspirational soccer players that capture the interest of both young and old alike. From the question asked, 25% of the respondents said they have no clue who their favorite player would be, but the others did come up with a few names they consider to be the greats: the name Ronaldinho was stated by half of the respondents among other names like Casillas, Buffon, Rivaldo, Ronaldo, and Romario. The name Maradona was also mentioned though he no longer plays but now coaches the Argentinean soccer team. One respondent said: "Michael Carrick and Roy Keane (Manchester United) inspire me because they are both defensive midfielders (the position I like to play in)

#### **Making sense of Africa's river waters: inter-basin water transfers as a means for achieving greater political stability**

*Mahmoud El Zain*

From a water security perspective, we are now certain of the negative impact of political instability in Africa, especially associated with civil war, in inducing water scarcity. Civil wars, and for that matter other similar disturbances and natural hazards, cause the wasting of rains (or, "green water"<sup>1</sup>) by depopulating affected regions. Consequently, they cause relative water scarcity in the more secure regions, which become the target for resettlement and concentration of displaced groups from the depopulated regions. Target secure regions where displaced population concentrate, especially in the Nile basin, are mostly the arid parts along the downstream river banks, where "blue water" is used for irrigation.



Water scarcity, caused by population concentration or otherwise, seems to increasingly engage riparian states in collective action with the goal of overcoming it and achieving greater prosperity and stability in the respective river basin. The Strategic Action Programme of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), for instance, has clearly emphasized, as part of its objectives, the ensuring of security and peace for all people of the basin. However, I argue, there is no reference to resolving the current conflicts that are likely to impede the programme of action. In fact, there is no definition of the security to be ensured, let alone description of the way it will be ensured. The NBI, in this regard, seems preoccupied with an economic conception, which sees all solutions as following from economic development—to be attained through launching water-use related projects. The geographical domain in which the conflicts occur is, apparently, limited to the basin territory with external

<sup>1</sup> Green water in the words of Falkenmark and Lundqvist (1999:131) refers to the 'the fractions of rainfall that will be available as soil moisture'.

impacts considered insignificant or completely excluded.

In this paper, the conventional wisdom of economically-driven *intra*-basin solutions is contested and instead a politically-defined *inter*-basin approach is advanced. The latter approach aims at viewing the Nile Basin and the Congo Basin as part and parcel of one hydropolitical security complex, where solutions to problems in one basin are necessary for addressing problems in the other. Both basins are experiencing political instability; however, the first suffers from water scarcity, while the latter is the top African river in terms of discharge and world-wide second only to Amazon. The Nile is shared by ten nation-states, including the Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, while the Congo is shared by seven nation-states DRC, the Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Zambia, Angola, Cameroon, and Tanzania.

The paper is divided into three sections. The first addresses the quest of the Nile riparian states for increasing the Nile water supply. The second section explores how the Congo River may contribute, through inter-basin water transfers, to solving the water scarcity in the Nile Basin. The last section asserts the need for recognising the regional and local scales as analytical units, therefore the need to move beyond the narrow hydro-sovereignty imperatives to the hydro-solidarity horizons.

#### ***The Nile striving to overcome water scarcity***

Increased population numbers are viewed by many observers as the major cause for water scarcity in the Nile Basin. However, recent research showed that it is population concentration in irrigable parts of the basin that seems to be the main current cause of "blue water" scarcity (El Zain 2007), while rain-fed zones continue to have their rainfall (though erratic) that historically sustained the livelihoods of communities in those zones. The Nile, in particular, is experiencing increased out-migration of communities from those "insecure" rain-fed zones namely due to conflicts and the settlement and concentration of these communities in the "secure" irrigable zone hereafter referred to as the Riverain Zone (RZ).

enormous efforts made by women who articulated their needs and concerns. Organisations like the Department of Gender and Women Studies Makerere University, Action for Development (ACFODE), Uganda Women Lawyers Association (FIDA), Uganda Women's Network (UWONET), National Association of Women's Organisations in Uganda (NAWOU), and many more, have been lobbying, advocating and strategising for gender mainstreaming in all domains.

#### Challenges to female empowerment in Uganda

In spite of the advances mentioned above, women in Uganda still face hardships, given the immensity of the challenges they are faced with. The social and cultural discourses affecting women's participation in politics and decision-making is still largely unfavourable. At the political level, the multifaceted social construction of gender roles within the extended African family cannot be ignored, as it creates barriers of subordination, segregation, exploitation and oppression among the majority of women who are still unaware of their right to participation in politics and development issues.

The political and ideological construction of the African family enables men to perceive women as their possessions because, for the majority of them, they have been socialized into believing that men are the heads of the household. They, as women, are most appreciated when they are subdued and accept that it is the men who have authority. Married women leaders at this level are often constrained in their political ambition of fighting for women's interests and issues, because they are expected to conform to the socially constructed stereotypes. Such social attitudes have undermined the value and quality of women in political leadership.

Women who are in positions of power, therefore, have tended to take on individualistic interests or partisan or monetary gains and are not seen to be advancing women's issues or the gender agenda. Many women seem to have forgotten why they had been elected into those positions of power. This has led to a loss of direction in the drive to advocate for change and transformation for other women in society.

Even where some provisions have been provided, for example, through the constitutional reforms, many of the women at the grass roots still find no

opportunity to use them, due to poverty, ignorance, or subordination. They will not dare to stand up for their rights due to high illiteracy levels and the traditional belief that it is best for them to accept the "second position in society". These women need to be liberated from fear of men, who they hold like their war lords. They need to develop the capacity to stand up for their rights and claim equal opportunity to services, resources and participation in development. They need the empowerment to stretch out for what is socially due to them as equal citizens with the men in our society. That is when we, as women will share the same reality of seeing gender mainstreamed, and hearing the women's voices. That is when we will be together with other women in the world claiming gender justice. But has this time come?

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Lilian Apio is a master's degree candidate in Gender and Peace Building at the University for Peace in Costa Rica.

and are leaders of their teams on and off the field". What stood out for this respondent was the leadership ability of the player and in any sport; those players that have this ability usually succeed. The respondent also explained that, those players put in a lot of effort every time they play but are often overlooked by soccer fans, despite the fact that their role is just as important as a striker's.

*Do you think University for Peace soccer team would reach the world cup?*

Was that a joke? No one needed to answer that one but they felt they were entitled to do so. And as rightly said by one respondent, "perhaps... why not?", "I think that one day, a UPEACE student will make it to the world cup (**most likely as a representative fan!!**)". But there were those who took it seriously and went all out in saying, "the football group will get so good that they will qualify, and we'll support the crap out of them! Whoo-hoo!!" Then the academics came into focus when one respondent made it clear that there is not enough time to train and go to school at the same time but still suggested that we should put together an excursion and go to join the revelry. This last respondent was much more visionary: *I think UPEACE could definitely reach the World Cup because there is such an international selection of people and players. If everyone brought their country's soccer style, and they could all be blended together here at UPEACE, it would make for a pretty great soccer team. Soccer is the international language and I think that a place that brings so many people from around the world together under a common goal would be a great place for a powerful soccer team to emerge.*

As soccer continues to be one of the greatest sports in the world, let's not forget that the World Cup presents unique opportunities to promote global peace and international understanding. So we ask ourselves, what is the purpose of the soccer World Cup? We know that it brings the world together, but when the excitement is over we all await the next one. South Africa is now in a perfect position to initiate and use this great opportunity to make a lasting statement that could instill a new purpose in international sports, and leave an example for the next nation to host the 2014 Soccer World Cup and those to come.

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Candido Bardalez is a master's degree candidate in Peace Education at the University for Peace in Costa Rica.

### The 21<sup>st</sup> Century Turning Point: An Overview of the USA Foreign Policy Direction after the Elections of November 2008

*Ochieng Kamudhayi*

The day was like any other, save for the fact that the USA had just elected its first black American President. It was on everyone's lips. For me it was more endearing for specific reasons. Being a Kenyan I somehow felt associated, since Kenyans claim that he is their son. The issue of lineage here may look trivial but if you read Phillip Ochieng's article in the Daily Nation<sup>1</sup> a little light is thrown into the sentiment that I had this morning. As the bus rumbled towards UPEACE round those harrowing turns, I would have been engrossed in my thoughts save for the debate that raged in the bus. Two views were being expressed about the results of Obama's election. There were people who felt that Obama's election would change things in the USA and the world, on the one hand, and on the other were others who that felt nothing would change. Africa's hopes were dashed even as they thought that for once there was somebody in the White House who they felt close to. This second thesis was based on the thinking that Obama is an American president and not an African one, and the claim that America has never changed despite the occupation of the presidency by different individuals.

It is on this basis that I would really like to revisit the issues and bring the discourse to a wider audience. What follows, therefore, are my thoughts about the potential for change in the United States, and the significance of the latest presidential election in that country. This discourse is important to the UPEACE community, and the world, because the activities of the USA do have a bearing on international peace and security.

<sup>1</sup> See Phillip Ochieng, “,” Daily Nation, 8<sup>th</sup> February, Nairobi, 2009

The debate in this case is wider than the scope of this article, and on both sides are pundits who would wish to state their case. The central question of this discussion, therefore, is whether or not America will change with the election of Barack Obama as President. To examine this issue it is necessary to ask two further questions that may guide the investigation. The first question examines what constitutes change. The second deals with what brings about change within a state. But these questions have to be answered in the context of international relations. Within this realm the state's face is foreign policy. In other words we need to determine what constitutes American foreign policy and which drivers bring changes within that policy. The assumption being created here is that if those elements of foreign policy change then the foreign policy also changes.

Foreign policy is viewed as the sum total of all the actions, intentions and statements directed towards the external world and the responses to these actions, intentions and statements.<sup>2</sup> An analysis of such activities must focus on inputs that affect the foreign policy process, and this includes external, societal, governmental, and individual factors.<sup>3</sup> This may range from foreign diplomacy to foreign trade and the interactions of citizens from different countries. Foreign policy, as practiced today, emerged in the period after the Thirty Years War in Europe, when states were created and they needed to respect each other's sovereignty. In order to interact as sovereign equals, modern forms of diplomacy and international law evolved. To carry out the diplomatic activities the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emerged and today it is responsible in many countries for implementation of the foreign policy of a sovereign. In the USA, this institution is the state department. During the Bush administration the secretary of state was Condoleezza Rice while the new secretary is Hillary Clinton.

<sup>2</sup> See James N. Rosenau., Towards Single-Country Theories of Foreign Policy: The Case of USSR” in C. Herman., C. W. Kegley et al. *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*. (Boston: Allen& Unwin, 1987) pp 1,3.see also Harvey Starr, Russet & Bruce., *World Politics: A Menu for Choice* 3<sup>rd</sup> edn.(New York: W.H. Freeman, 1989.) p.186

<sup>3</sup>Deborah Gerner. “Foreign Policy Analysis: Renaissance, Routine, or Rubbish” in

### Status of Women Empowerment in Uganda

*Lilian Apio*

Right from the formulation of the forward looking strategies following the 1985 UN Women's World Conference in Nairobi, Uganda has been one of the African countries that have fought hard to uplift the status of women through the different empowerment programs currently taking place in the country. In the 1980s, it was one of the first African countries to establish a Ministry for Women in Development. This was later reinforced with the provisions of The Ugandan Constitution in 1995, chapter four of which clearly stipulates articles in favour of women's rights, as sighted below:



*Art. 33.*

- (1) Women shall be accorded full and equal dignity of the person with men.*
- (2) The State shall provide the facilities and opportunities necessary to enhance the welfare of women to enable them to realize their full potential and advancement.*
- (3) The State shall protect women and their rights, taking into account their unique status and natural maternal functions in society.*
- (4) Women shall have the right to equal treatment with men and that right shall include equal opportunities in political, economic and social activities.*
- (5) Without prejudice to article 32 of this Constitution, women shall have the right to affirmative action for the purpose of redressing the imbalances created by history, tradition or custom.*
- (6) Laws, cultures, customs or traditions which are against the dignity, welfare or interest of women or which undermine their status are prohibited by this Constitution.*

In the political arena, women in Uganda have equal opportunities with men to run for and hold any political position in the country, at least in principle. The recent shift from a one-party to a multi-party system in the 2006 elections offers further opportunities for women's political participation. The 1995 Uganda Constitution clearly supports women's political participation, reserving them one seat per district in the

national parliament. Currently, women hold 23.9% of the 305 seats in the Ugandan parliament.

In the economic sector, within both public and private enterprises, women have equal opportunities in Uganda, and the constitution ensures equal payment for equal work without discrimination. The employer of every female worker is bound by law to accord her protection during pregnancy and after birth.

Culturally, some traditional practices that are dangerous to the physical, social, or economic wellbeing of women are discouraged in the country. The government of Uganda is working out measures to enforce a law that will completely ban the practice of female circumcision among those practising it; for instance, in Sabinu communities in Eastern Uganda. The current Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Affairs has been outspoken in its campaign against the negative effects that this practice has had on the general welfare of women and girls.

A Domestic Relations Bill has also been tabled in parliament to address the issues of polygamy, bride price, cohabitation, marital rape, widow inheritance, and female genital mutilation. Once this bill is passed in parliament, the above mentioned issues, which mostly affect women, will be resolved and clear legal mechanisms will be developed to enforce the law where it is broken. Much as this Bill is facing resistance in parliament by many male members of parliament who sympathise with bad habits related to the above offences, it represents a major instrument which would liberate women from gender based violence in their daily lives.

Within the educational sector, the affirmative actions, which were proposed by women and passed by parliament, have increased women's access to education all the way through to the university level, where every girl who qualifies for a place in the public universities is given an extra 1.5 points. This has created opportunities for girls to get into the scientific and professional courses. Generally, within enterprises and the public service, it has become the norm to expect every committee or board to incorporate gender balance in their composition criteria.

This average rate of gender sensitivity has not emerged accidentally; it has evolved from

believe the confusion originated in Iraq from the Bush Doctrine. Whereas in one region the USA forces are considered as occupiers and exploiters here they are being viewed as collaborators with locals in keeping away a common enemy, the Taliban. In creating an upsurge in Afghanistan and reducing troop levels in the Iraq there is clearly a shift in US foreign policy because the dynamics are different, in the two countries. In one it is collaboration and in the other it was an occupation.

But what is in all this for Africa? The main thrust of the argument here is that as things are changing elsewhere so things will change for Africa, If not in real terms then in the amount of goodwill. I know the question begs: how good is goodwill? Perhaps a paraphrasing of UNESCO's statement here can help to illustrate the idea: if all good things begin in the minds of men and women, then the goodwill in the hearts and minds of Americans will have far reaching consequences for the people of Africa.

In conclusion, I would wish to close the whole debate by remaining positive that the USA elections have changed the dynamics of US foreign policy from an abrasive and arrogant approach to a more cautious and consultative one. While this means less US unilateralism, which is not equivalent to isolationism, because the US cannot afford that either within these four years or beyond. In any case, it will be interesting to observe and see.

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Ochieng Kamudhayi is a master's degree candidate in Peace Education at the University for Peace in Costa Rica.

This discussion needs to start with thoughts about change. There is a well known adage that human beings are never comfortable with change. Change is usually resisted in this regard by those in positions of power and those complacent with the status quo. From this perspective, change is hopeless since those who have an interest in maintaining the status quo will undermine any attempts to bring about change. Resistance to change of any sort can be explained in the USA by the political influence of bureaucratic institutions and individuals seen as conformists. Nevertheless, it is obvious that change is an important aspect of human existence making it an inevitable phenomenon. Throughout history, therefore, changes have occurred. Clearly, the struggle between forces of change and those of the status quo remains, and history is replete with evidence of forces opposed to change succumbing to change. One example is the very election of Obama as president. There is strong evidence that many pundits did not even imagine that Obama could win the primaries against Hillary Clinton. I remember having a conversation with some friends sometime in 2007 who ruled out such a possibility as a farfetched dream. When time showed his resilience, and he faced McCain, the pundits now saw the end of the game. But as that faded away it was the emergence of Sarah Palin that gave the impression that the dice was cast on Obama's candidacy. Time once more proved this prophesy to be untrue. I recount these events because if history is anything to go by, then a new dawn could be setting in and we need to read the signs of the time.

Having taken the oath of office, now the pundits are on the issue that America is the same old "Wild West." The argument here proceeds from the understanding that US foreign policy fluctuated between isolationism and outward involvement throughout history. Prior to World War I and II the USA avoided any engagement outside the Americas. This strategy was informed by the ideal that Europe and USA would have no ties beyond the migrants in history. This policy was strongly advocated for by the USA's founding presidents. The USA managed to develop without any involvement outside the continent until the time of World War I. Even as the war begun in August, 1914 the USA declared neutrality in the war and stayed that way until attacks on her ships made her declare war in 1917. This was followed by a period of withdrawal again. For that reason the

USA did not sign the treaty that formed the League of Nations, despite its president having been the architect of the organization. However, the isolationist policy was abrogated once again during World War II when Japan attacked her ships at Pearl Harbor. The USA eventually responded by dropping the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The formation of the United Nations followed, and the USA once again became engaged in world affairs. By the time of the Cold War, the USA was leading a group of spirited allies across the globe to contain communism. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 left the USA exposed and, as the sole super power, the country could not disengage from the world arena. Bush senior engaged the USA in the Gulf War. Nevertheless, the death of 18 Marines in Somalia dampened US spirits in even cautious engagements. Although Clinton reverted to isolationism, he had to respond to Al Qaeda by bombing Sudan and Libya.

The 9/11 attacks on US soil changed the policy from cautious engagement and partial withdrawal to direct confrontation. The Bush Doctrine meant that the USA not only hunted down its enemies all over the world but also took the war to its enemies' "doorstep" in what viewed as a preemptive strategy. So what brought a country that once kept to itself to take the lead in the world stage? This indicates that there is a significant change from an oscillation between withdrawal and engagement to one of constant engagement and even aggressive pursuit. This change is the result of historical challenges that the USA has faced. The second reason can be traced through the USA politics. During the presidency of the first Bush, USA responded to the aggression of Saddam Hussein against its allies in the Middle East. Clinton had to respond to the threats of Osama Bin Laden. George W. Bush was forced to wage an all out war, and so the USA was no longer the same. Another reason is traceable in the characters involved. Whereas the Clinton administration tried to remain inward looking, the two Bush's administrations were outward looking, thus making the foreign policy totally outgoing. Events like the 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Kuwait gave the perfect opportunity for the two regimes to do what they liked best, keep Americans engaged elsewhere, and distracted from domestic policies. During the peace period when America was not engaged in war, they essentially promoted liberal democracy. The

argument here was given that America had to open more free trade possibilities by ensuring the spread of liberal democracy and a market economy in the world. In pursuing these strategies the USA, as always, is protecting the best of its interests as seen by its politicians.

So in this entire picture where does Obama fit in? There are two ways of approaching this question, one is asking whether the election of Obama is business as usual for the USA, and the other is asking whether or not the new government stands on a historic threshold for change. The answers are "probably not" and "just possibly". Although Obama's political prospects are not good, they are less bad than those for the last regime. He begins with a benefit of doubt from both his foes and friends.

First, it has been established that US policy can change, as history has shown. It has moved from withdrawal to engagement and now active engagement. From an oscillatory approach to one that is clearly setting the pace. Of course, one could point out that this is the trend, and that no one has ever broken from this cycle. In this, many would point to the fact that politics are institutionalized in the USA and cannot be influenced by individuals. Whereas I am tempted to agree with this line of argument, it is necessary to recognize the fact that the institutions are comprised of individuals. Once in good numbers, individuals can easily steer the institution in a different direction. It is apparent that Obama has the clout, with supporters in the congress and senate that are sentimentally disavowed destroyers of any Bush legacy. So the Bush doctrine is being chipped away slowly. This window of opportunity can be fully utilized by anyone to cause drastic changes. Obviously, in this direction the new president is chipping away expressions like "war on terror" and "axis of evil". The abandonment of these terms and their replacement with more subtle expressions like "constructive dialogue," "partnership," "engagement," and expressions like "consultation," has created a more receptive and open attitude among some leaders including Fidel Castro.<sup>4</sup> It is

<sup>4</sup> Fidel Castor has written a long article in the Newspapers of Havana welcoming dialogue. Others

argued here that language is a key component in fashioning images and pictures of relationships. More so language the role of language in diplomacy cannot be underscored. The subtle language has elicited a response of "wait-and-see" and a de-escalation of rhetoric between the USA and Iran, for example.<sup>5</sup> It has given hope to Cuba, and even Europe now feels more comfortable with the USA.<sup>6</sup> On this basis, there are two issues to be discerned. One is that individuals can affect and change American policy as long as they are in sufficient numbers and use language differently. Secondly, that Obama took office at a time when the domestic environment in the USA was hostile to a combative USA foreign policy. Many Americans, and other people, are yearning for a break. That provides the right environment in which drastic changes can take place.

Additionally, foreign policy does change when there is a change in leadership and environment. For sure, USA leadership has changed in terms of individuals personalities. In this case Obama, Hillary and others are different from Bush and Rice. But this is basic. One factor to consider is the global crisis that has hit the financial sector. To be able to assert its authority, the USA as a hegemonic power, must have the military and financial means. These two conditions have deteriorated considerably between Bush and Obama. The latter has inherited a collapsed economy. Essentially, if the USA does not recover from this it might not be able to effectively push its agenda in the world. This is not to say that the world will lack agenda setters. In fact, its opponents like China are already coming on to the world stage. Recently, the Chinese have started courtship with Britain, one of USA allies in Europe. China is also moving fast in other parts like Africa, South America. There is also the recovery of Russia. Weighed down by the cost of too many wars in different fronts, Obama has no choice but to re-orient the USA's foreign policy. In this part, therefore, the argument is that US institutions

leaders willing to talk to the USA now include Russian President Medvedev.

<sup>5</sup> Ayatollah Khomeini in a recent address to the Iraqis acknowledged this changed rhetoric had changed and called for accompanying actions.

<sup>6</sup> This has seen the return of France to the NATO Alliance during the European tour of Obama.

cannot pursue the same strategies that they used in the past eight years simply because the landscape has changed. It is inevitable that there will be changes to USA's foreign policy.

Lastly, I want to look at change from a purely personal view. It has been argued by scholars of decision Debate on how individuals usually impact on the Foreign policy of a country still continues with different scholars taking different viewpoints. Herman, Snyder, and Etheredge's<sup>7</sup> works are among those that inform that debate. Herman Identifies these factors as personal characteristics of leaders, which comprises their worldview political style, interests, political socialization, training in foreign affairs among others as important components that inform such a view<sup>8</sup> making theory that decisions are sometimes influenced by the character of the individual. Although many scholars of foreign policy would be quick to dismiss this case when it comes to America, I will hold on to it as a valid argument. Despite the huge institutional capacity of USA policy, the impact of individuals in decision-making, in the USA or elsewhere, can never be ignored. Throughout history, individual presidents have influenced US policy. Kissinger unilaterally constructed the containment policy against the Soviet Union. Bush constructed the terrorism policy. Lincoln, Truman, Roosevelt, and Eisenhower all influenced US policy. Pundits will argue that Obama is unlikely to affect anything because his circumstances are extraordinary: he is a black American; he has two wars in his hand, and there is the acrimony with North Korea and Iran, the flare up of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, and the dwindling economy. Despite all these events,

<sup>7</sup> Margaret Herman. "Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviors Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders" *International Quarterly* 24(1) 1980:67-73. see also Richard Snyder C.H.W.Bruck et al. Decision Making as An Approach to the Study of International Politics. *Foreign Policy Analysis Series* No.3, Princeton, 1954& Lloyd Etheredge. "Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1898-1968: A Test of Interpersonal Generalization Theory." *American Political Science Review* 72(2) 1978a: 434-71. see also Makumi Mwangiru, *Diplomacy: Documents, Methods and Practice*. IDIS Publication on International Studies.1, Nairobi, 2004. ch 11

<sup>8</sup> Ibid pp.67-73.

that may not give him latitude to romanticize with foreign policy, there is hope for the better. For instance, now he can easily rally domestic support to end war and pursue soft politics because most Americans are fatigued by the war. Secondly, because of Obama's charisma and personality many people are looking up to him for inspiration. Indeed, this charisma is reflected in his speeches and style of handling things. As a matter of fact, the signal that is being received by people in Africa is that of positive energy. Whereas US interests may remain the same, the mode and spirit with which the interest may be pursued has changed drastically. The hawks have largely been replaced by the doves in the White House. There is a sympathetic ear within the government and this is what may shift the ground for America's foreign policy. Essentially the way of engagement and perception is changing. In a recent reading, the president went down to the press room at the White House basement and his demeanor sort of disrupted the whole operation system setting. These kinds of actions set the tone and tenor of government bureaucracy even in the most rigid of the systems. From a psychological perspective, the new president's personality and ambiance will definitely set the tone and mood of the defining parameters and the mode of execution of US policy. In this, the world can rest assured that so far Obama has not shown the aggression of his predecessor. He seems to be graceful and deeply thoughtful. This will eventually be duplicated in his staff and the policy itself.

There is already talk of a troop surge in Afghanistan and a reduction in Iraq. It can be argued that nothing has changed, that it is the same thing in different geographical locations. I agree that at the face value this is the same. However, at an operational level, the two strategies are different and may have different effects on the ground. The geographical location of an action does influence the dynamics of the regional politics which may inform the interpretation of action taken. The same action in one location essentially does not translate to similar results. USA presence in Afghanistan is not perceived as an occupation the way it was in Iraq. Secondly, the purpose of the surge is clearly pegged not on hunting down Taliban but on creating an effective bastion of locals to prevent Taliban in roads in the area. This clarity of mission purpose was lacking in Iraq for a long time and the actions that resulted were confusing to the locals. I